[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
Proof.--If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things
future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same
way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking
merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,
there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be
assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we
may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser
good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a
lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater
good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,
because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This
Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the
Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.
Note.--If these statements be compared with what we have
pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part
up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a
man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is
led by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actions
whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and
only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance
in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the
former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose
disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few
observations.
PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things;
and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
Proof.--A free man is one who lives under the guidance of
reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly
desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words
(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his
being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore
such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom
is a meditation of life. Q.E.D.
PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they
remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
Proof.--I call free him who is led solely by reason; he,
therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only
adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no
conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being
correlative) of good. Q.E.D.
Note.--It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of
this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as
we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so
far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the
cause of man's existence.
This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.
For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save
that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he
provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God
forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,
he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.
Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in
entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be
nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that
after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway
began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his
freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the
patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of
God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire
for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have
shown above (IV. xxxvii.).
PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,
when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
Proof.--Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion
contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining
emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions,
which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.):
hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring
than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of
the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.--The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as
in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of
mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
Note.--What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,
I explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything,
which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,
&c.
PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,
as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
Proof.--Everyone judges what is good according to his
disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who
has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon
it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the
receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only
desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not
repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,
but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,
and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become
hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than
reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving
their favours.
Note.--I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant,
yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human
aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often
necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay
such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in
declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of
despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious
motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for
offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in
declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility
and courtesy.
PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to
another.
Proof.--Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,
and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of
friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,
with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.
xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one
to another. Q.E.D.
Note.--The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire
have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,
rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an
emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a
man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c.
He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,
is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the
gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal
his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one
shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be
corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.
PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
good faith.
Proof.--If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a
case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the
danger of present death? Would not his plan of self--preservation
completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by
pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would
persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason
would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their
forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any
general laws, which is absurd.
PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in
a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in
solitude, where he is independent.
Proof.--The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey
through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to
preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is
(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,
he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.
xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.
ii.), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore
the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to
possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.
Note.--These and similar observations, which we have made on
man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to
courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not
think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of
strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no
man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no
man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These
propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and
religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.;
namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every
man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.
We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.
l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever
first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity
of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful
and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,
horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his
own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.
Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they
really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such
as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar
emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as
we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on
his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining
to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in
the following Part.
APPENDIX.
What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life
has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,
but has been set forth piece--meal, according as I thought each
Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.
I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
under leading heads.
I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the
necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either
through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our
being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived
through itself without other individuals.
II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,
that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are
referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to
consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only
referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things
inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined
not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to
us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter
passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,
on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be
either good or bad.
IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect
the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone
man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed
blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which
arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the
understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's
attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of
his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the
ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all
his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate
conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his
intelligence.
V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational
life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his
enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by
intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's
perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational
life, are alone called evil.
VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are
necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external
causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal
nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to
conform to in almost infinite ways.
VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if
he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with
his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,
whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in
harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate
himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.
VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be
capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the
rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems
safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good
or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the
rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we
think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right
of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.
IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any
given thing than other individuals of the same species;
therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and
the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful
than his fellow--man who is led by reason. Further, as we know
not anything among individual things which is more excellent than
a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his
skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at
last to live under the dominion of their own reason.
X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of
hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are
therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful
than their fellows.
XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and
high--mindedness.
XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate
their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds
as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and
generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.
XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.
For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the
guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and
more prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force of
character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to
restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But
those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at
vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than
strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and
others. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from
misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes
rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably
endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and
choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their
father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as
they may spite their parents.
XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in
everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common
brings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is
better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive
to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and
friendship.
XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are
attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For men
brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is
reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received
customs of their society. For winning love those qualities are
especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.
IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).
XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such
harmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of
spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the
same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a
certain resemblance to piety.
XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially
such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain
life. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the
power and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of
any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.
Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited
for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing
for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and
has regard only to the general advantage.
XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our
duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).
XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of
generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort
of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,
readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a
species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than
harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).
XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in
harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not
engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to
beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the
love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused
by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.
XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by
means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None are
more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be
first, but are not.
XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety
and religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet
is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.
note).
XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such
matters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of
pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.
XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are
directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;
and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance
to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass
judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's
rights.
XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire
of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to
piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.). But, if it spring
from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under
the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and
seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word
or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,
I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:
not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called
after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his
conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and
will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but
he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way
whereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by
fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to
endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to
reason.
XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature
in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with
ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,
whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our
advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or
destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to
our use as best we may.
XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to
us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from
observing them, and from recombining their elements in different
forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this
point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and
nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their
functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of being
affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external
bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind
capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.). But there seem to be
very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due
nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.
For the human body is composed of very many parts of different
nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so
that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything
that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the
mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.
XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of
each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one
another mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for
everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind
of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly
conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the
idea of money as cause.
XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek
money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but
because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring
themselves to great splendour. Certainly they nourish their
bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they
lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of
their body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fix
the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,
live content with little.
XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the
various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their
functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid
to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;
it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.
But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us
pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit
our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred
to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore
most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at
hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become
excessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most
regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate
what is future with emotions equally vivid. (IV. xliv. note, and
lx. note.)
XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as
good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.
However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious
take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the
pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection
whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the
divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated
by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is
led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by
reason.
XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is
infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have
not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those
things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an
equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims
of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have
done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not
sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;
remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we
follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding
of this, that part of our nature which is defined by
intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will
assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence
will endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent
beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,
nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which
is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding
of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is
in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.
PART V:
Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom
PREFACE
At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which
is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore
treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the
reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental
Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much
more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part
of my design to point out the method and means whereby the
understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the
body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of
its functions. The latter question lies in the province of
Medicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore,
I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of
reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its
dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.
That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have
already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions
depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely
govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the
protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and
moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the
example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house--dog
and the other a hunting--dog. For by long training it could be
brought about, that the house--dog should become accustomed to
hunt, and the hunting--dog to cease from running after hares. To
this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained,
that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of
the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the
aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which
are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which
the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various
ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst
of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of
the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the
midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal
spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different
marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different
external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;
whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the
gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once
before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the
gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
determining them to the condition wherein they were, when
repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further
asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature
to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever
anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition
causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in
question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the
mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,
inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the
animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would
dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with
the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to
look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that,
although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been
united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole
number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet
it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de
l'âme, I.50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,
that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power
over its passions. For passions as defined by him are
"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are
referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)
are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement
of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27). But, seeing that we
can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,
to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely
on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with
sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our
actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which
we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an
absolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of
this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his
own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could
hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I
am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,
that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from
self--evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not
clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to
task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through
occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which
occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I
ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and
distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union
with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like
him to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he
had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,
that he could not assign any particular cause of the union
between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have
recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.
Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the
mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it
hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can
be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the
animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we
have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again
disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would
follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given
danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,
yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended
in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything
except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of
volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between
the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;
consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined
by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no
gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it
can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that
all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the
brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes
concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have
abundantly proved that his premisses are false. Therefore, since
the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the
understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of
the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all
have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or
distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those
conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
AXIOMS.
I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a
change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of
the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.
II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,
in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence
of its cause.
(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)
PROPOSITIONS.
PROP. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or
the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
associated in the body.
Proof.--The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.
vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the
order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and
vii.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as
the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place
according to the order and association of modifications of the
body (II. xviii.), so vice versâ (III. ii.) the order and
connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance
with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are
arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.
PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,
from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other
thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external
cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these
emotions, be destroyed.
Proof.--That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,
is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is
removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;
therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are
destroyed. Q.E.D.
PROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a
passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
Proof.--An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by
the general Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a
clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only
be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to
the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III.
iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.
Corollary--An emotion therefore becomes more under our
control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in
proportion as it is more known to us.
PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we
cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
Proof.--Properties which are common to all things can only be
conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and
Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,
whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an
emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general
Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding
Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.
Note.--Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain
this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence
it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked,
that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.
For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his own
fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by
reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives
by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like
manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to
any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions
(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in
a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save
that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
above (III. iii.).
PROP. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
Proof.--An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be
free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be
necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one
towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).
But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to
conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes
whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);
therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply
is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel
towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,
consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.
PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
necessary.
Proof.--The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an
infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing
Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less
subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)
feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.
Note.--The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly
and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the
emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the
pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as
the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means
have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an
infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,
because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.
Whereas, if most people were born full--grown and only one here
and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because
infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and
necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may
note several other instances of the same sort.
PROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
Proof.--We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the
emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,
being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the
said thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is
referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a
nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.
vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from
reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things
(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always
regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their
present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which
are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external
causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the
emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.
PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
Proof.--Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
becomes stronger. Q.E.D.
Note--This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.
PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
single cause.
Proof.--An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);
therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is
unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.
Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.
vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less
passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of
several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few
or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this
emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to
several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.
Q.E.D.
PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
Proof.--The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that
is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede
the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). So long, therefore, as
we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the
mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.
xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear
and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.
note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such
cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of
the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.
Note.--By this power of rightly arranging and associating the
bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily
affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is
needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and
associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,
are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so
long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is
to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,
to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the
particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that
it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid
down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred
should be overcome with love or high--mindedness, and not required
with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be
always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think
over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and
in what manner and way they may be best warded off by
high--mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with
the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready
for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also
in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result
of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than
everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such
case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises
therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and
will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a
grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be
overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner
than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As
is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same
way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the
ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and
imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of
resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.
But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions
we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order
that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of
pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for
which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain
it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the
fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do
the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of
gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving
vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is
certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of
honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily
covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common
to all who are ill--used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.
For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the
misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely
torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not
only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So,
again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love
think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock
faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,
directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.
Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the
love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of
the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy
which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise
desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently
observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for
the most part, to direct his actions according to the
commandments of reason.
[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
PROP. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and
occupies the mind more.
Proof.--In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is
referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can
be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;
therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in
full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.
PROP. XII. The mental images of things are more easily
associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
and distinctly understand, than with others.
Proof.--Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,
are either the common properties of things or deductions
therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are
consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.
Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate
other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of
the said things should be more often associated with the images
of these than with the images of something else. Q.E.D.
PROP. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as
it is associated with a greater number of other images.
Proof.--In proportion as an image is associated with a greater
number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.
PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of
God.
Proof.--There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind
may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);
wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred
to the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.
PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
more understands himself and his emotions.
Proof.--He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is
(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore
(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the
same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more
understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.
PROP. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in
the mind.
Proof.--For this love is associated with all the modifications
of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);
therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.
Q.E.D.
PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by
any emotion of pleasure or pain.
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