pleasure or pain.
Corollary.--Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate
anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any
emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,
vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.
PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.
Proof.--The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect
(II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,
we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be
no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of
the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
Note.--It may be objected that, as we understand God as the
cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause
of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the
causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a
passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore,
in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to
that extent feel pleasure.
PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should
love him in return.
Proof.--For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.
xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is
absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion
of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in
proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to
God by the same bond of love.
Proof.--This love towards God is the highest good which we can
seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common
to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice
therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),
it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of
jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note);
but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in
proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
therein. Q.E.D.
Note.--We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion
directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be
destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God
is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as
it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the
body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is
referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
I have now gone through all the remedies against the
emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can
do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over
the emotions consists:----
I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).
II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the
thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.
ii. and V. iv. note).
III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions
referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those
referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner
(V. vii.).
IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]
are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of
things or to God (V. ix. xi.).
[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus----emotions.
V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and
associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and
xii. xiii. xiv.).
But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
may be better understood, it should be specially observed that
the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion
of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is
more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are
comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,
and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than
by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.
Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge
only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it
may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by
its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active,
whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,
although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former
mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas
attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human
infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual
unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to
excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,
and which we can never become masters of. For no one is
solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;
neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in
regard to things whereof no one can be really master.
We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and
distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge
(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,
possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy
them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at
any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind
(V. xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable
and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession
(II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which
are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to
strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and
deeply penetrate it.
And now I have finished with all that concerns this present
life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have
briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And
this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has
attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the
definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to
Propositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now, therefore, time
to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of
the mind, without relation to the body.
PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
is past, while the body endures.
Proof.--The mind does not express the actual existence of its
body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as
actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and,
consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine
any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.
Thus it
cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.
xvii. note),
or remember things past, except while the body endures (see
definition of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D.
PROP. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,
which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the
form of eternity.
Proof.--God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or
that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This
essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the
very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a
certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must
necessarily exist in God (II. iii.). Q.E.D.
PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.
Proof.--There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which
expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,
therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence
of the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not assigned to the
human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as
it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained
through duration, and may be defined by time--that is (II. viii.
Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the
essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.--This idea, which expresses the essence of the body
under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode
of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should
remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear
no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in
terms of time, or have any relation to time. But,
notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the
mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no
less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the
mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than
proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before
the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the
essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and
that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or
explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to
endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in
so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far
only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more
do we understand God.
Proof.--This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.
PROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
Proof.--The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,
in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or
nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to
understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of
understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
more to understand things by that kind.
Proof--This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the
mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of
knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to
conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable
thereof. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the
highest possible mental acquiescence.
Proof.--The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.
xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge
(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind
knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):
consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge
passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such
pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own
virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of
knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the
third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the
second kind of knowledge.
Proof.--This proposition is self--evident. For whatsoever we
understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that
is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are
referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)
cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and
are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from
adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of
knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of
knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from
the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the
present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving
the essence of the body under the form of eternity.
Proof.--In so far as the mind conceives the present existence
of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be
determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of
conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But
eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the
power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it
possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to
conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to
conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to
the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of
conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the
mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body
under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.
Note.--Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as
existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in
God and following from the necessity of the divine nature.
Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we
conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the
eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and
note, which see.
PROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body
under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a
knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived
through God.
Proof.--Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this
involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to
conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things
in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as
real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the
essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that
extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
Proof.--The mind does not conceive anything under the form of
eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is
eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so
far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which
knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,
in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything
which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in
other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge
(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind
(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or
formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.
Note.--In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in
this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of
himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and
blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must
here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind
is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of
eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more
readily explained and better understood, we will consider the
mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to
understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have
done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so
long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our
premisses are plain.
PROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of
knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by
the idea of God as cause.
Proof.--From this kind of knowledge arises the highest
possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,
xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea
of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the
idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--From the third kind of knowledge necessarily
arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge
arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is
(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as
we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we
understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the
intellectual love of God.
PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from
the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
Proof.--The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.
Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises
therefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.--Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing
Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of
love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.
of the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except that
the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we
feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of
God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to
a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the
mind being endowed with perfection itself.
PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject
to those emotions which are attributable to passions.
Proof.--Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind
contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea
indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than
the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).
Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,
in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;
therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,
subject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that no love save intellectual
love is eternal.
Note.--If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that
they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that
they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the
imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after
death.
PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual
love.
Proof.--God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.
Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;
and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of
himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause:
now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as
intellectual love.
PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is
that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as
he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the
essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;
in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is
part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.
Proof.--This love of the mind must be referred to the
activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is
itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself
accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.);
that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity
whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human
mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;
therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of
the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves
himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God
towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God
are identical.
Note.--From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein
our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in
the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love
towards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called
Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred
to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of
spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really
distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it
is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,
accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is
referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).
Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in
knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.
xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner
and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from
the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought
it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show
by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I
have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),
is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which
I have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although in
Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and
consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence
and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate
and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind
so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual
essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.
PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to
this intellectual love, or which can take it away.
Proof.--This intellectual love follows necessarily from the
nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through
the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).
If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary
to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;
consequently, that, which should be able to take away this
love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious
absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.--The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular
things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given
time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.
PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things
by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to
those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
Proof.--The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);
therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by
the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently
(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not
touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in
other words, evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind
understands more things by the second and third kinds of
knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains
unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.--Hence we understand that point which I touched on in
IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;
namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the
mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,
consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again,
since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest
possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind
can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which
we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of
little importance when compared with the part which endures. But
I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.
PROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part
is eternal.
Proof.--He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which
are evil (IV. xxxviii.)--that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions
which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he
possesses the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,
and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the
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495
496
497
498
499
500