PART V:
Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom
PREFACE
At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which
is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore
treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the
reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental
Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much
more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part
of my design to point out the method and means whereby the
understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the
body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of
its functions. The latter question lies in the province of
Medicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore,
I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of
reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its
dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.
That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have
already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions
depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely
govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the
protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and
moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the
example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house--dog
and the other a hunting--dog. For by long training it could be
brought about, that the house--dog should become accustomed to
hunt, and the hunting--dog to cease from running after hares. To
this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained,
that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of
the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the
aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which
are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which
the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various
ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst
of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of
the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the
midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal
spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different
marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different
external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;
whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the
gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once
before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the
gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
determining them to the condition wherein they were, when
repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further
asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature
to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever
anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition
causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in
question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the
mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,
inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the
animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would
dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with
the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to
look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that,
although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been
united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole
number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet
it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de
l'âme, I.50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,
that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power
over its passions. For passions as defined by him are
"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are
referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)
are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement
of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27). But, seeing that we
can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,
to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely
on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with
sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our
actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which
we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an
absolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of
this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his
own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could
hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I
am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,
that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from
self--evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not
clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to
task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through
occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which
occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I
ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and
distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union
with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like
him to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he
had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,
that he could not assign any particular cause of the union
between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have
recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.
Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the
mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it
hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can
be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the
animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we
have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again
disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would
follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given
danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,
yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended
in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything
except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of
volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between
the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;
consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined
by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no
gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it
can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that
all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the
brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes
concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have
abundantly proved that his premisses are false. Therefore, since
the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the
understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of
the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all
have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or
distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those
conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
AXIOMS.
I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a
change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of
the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.
II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,
in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence
of its cause.
(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)
PROPOSITIONS.
PROP. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or
the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
associated in the body.
Proof.--The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.
vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the
order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and
vii.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as
the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place
according to the order and association of modifications of the
body (II. xviii.), so vice versâ (III. ii.) the order and
connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance
with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are
arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.
PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,
from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other
thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external
cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these
emotions, be destroyed.
Proof.--That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,
is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is
removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;
therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are
destroyed. Q.E.D.
PROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a
passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
Proof.--An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by
the general Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a
clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only
be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to
the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III.
iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.
Corollary--An emotion therefore becomes more under our
control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in
proportion as it is more known to us.
PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we
cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
Proof.--Properties which are common to all things can only be
conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and
Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,
whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an
emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general
Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding
Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.
Note.--Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain
this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence
it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked,
that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.
For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his own
fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by
reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives
by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like
manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to
any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions
(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in
a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save
that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
above (III. iii.).
PROP. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
Proof.--An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be
free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be
necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one
towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).
But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to
conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes
whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);
therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply
is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel
towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,
consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.
PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
necessary.
Proof.--The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an
infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing
Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less
subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)
feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.
Note.--The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly
and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the
emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the
pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as
the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means
have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an
infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,
because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.
Whereas, if most people were born full--grown and only one here
and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because
infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and
necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may
note several other instances of the same sort.
PROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
Proof.--We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the
emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,
being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the
said thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is
referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a
nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.
vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from
reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things
(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always
regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their
present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which
are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external
causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the
emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.
PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
Proof.--Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
becomes stronger. Q.E.D.
Note--This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.
PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
single cause.
Proof.--An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);
therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is
unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.
Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.
vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less
passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of
several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few
or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this
emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to
several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.
Q.E.D.
PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
Proof.--The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that
is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede
the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). So long, therefore, as
we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the
mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.
xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear
and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.
note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such
cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of
the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.
Note.--By this power of rightly arranging and associating the
bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily
affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is
needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and
associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,
are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so
long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is
to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,
to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the
particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that
it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid
down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred
should be overcome with love or high--mindedness, and not required
with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be
always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think
over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and
in what manner and way they may be best warded off by
high--mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with
the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready
for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also
in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result
of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than
everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such
case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises
therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and
will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a
grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be
overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner
than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As
is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same
way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the
ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and
imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of
resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.
But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions
we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order
that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of
pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for
which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain
it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the
fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do
the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of
gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving
vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is
certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of
honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily
covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common
to all who are ill--used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.
For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the
misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely
torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not
only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So,
again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love
think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock
faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,
directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.
Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the
love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of
the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy
which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise
desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently
observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for
the most part, to direct his actions according to the
commandments of reason.
[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
PROP. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and
occupies the mind more.
Proof.--In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is
referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can
be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;
therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in
full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.
PROP. XII. The mental images of things are more easily
associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
and distinctly understand, than with others.
Proof.--Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,
are either the common properties of things or deductions
therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are
consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.
Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate
other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of
the said things should be more often associated with the images
of these than with the images of something else. Q.E.D.
PROP. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as
it is associated with a greater number of other images.
Proof.--In proportion as an image is associated with a greater
number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.
PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of
God.
Proof.--There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind
may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);
wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred
to the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.
PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
more understands himself and his emotions.
Proof.--He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is
(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore
(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the
same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more
understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.
PROP. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in
the mind.
Proof.--For this love is associated with all the modifications
of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);
therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.
Q.E.D.
PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by
any emotion of pleasure or pain.
Proof.--All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and
therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without
passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a
lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of
the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
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