[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
Proof.--If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things
future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same
way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking
merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,
there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be
assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we
may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser
good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a
lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater
good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,
because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This
Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the
Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.
Note.--If these statements be compared with what we have
pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part
up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a
man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is
led by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actions
whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and
only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance
in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the
former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose
disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few
observations.
PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things;
and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
Proof.--A free man is one who lives under the guidance of
reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly
desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words
(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his
being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore
such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom
is a meditation of life. Q.E.D.
PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they
remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
Proof.--I call free him who is led solely by reason; he,
therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only
adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no
conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being
correlative) of good. Q.E.D.
Note.--It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of
this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as
we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so
far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the
cause of man's existence.
This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.
For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save
that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he
provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God
forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,
he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.
Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in
entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be
nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that
after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway
began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his
freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the
patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of
God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire
for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have
shown above (IV. xxxvii.).
PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,
when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
Proof.--Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion
contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining
emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions,
which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.):
hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring
than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of
the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.--The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as
in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of
mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
Note.--What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,
I explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything,
which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,
&c.
PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,
as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
Proof.--Everyone judges what is good according to his
disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who
has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon
it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the
receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only
desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not
repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,
but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,
and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become
hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than
reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving
their favours.
Note.--I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant,
yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human
aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often
necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay
such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in
declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of
despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious
motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for
offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in
declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility
and courtesy.
PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to
another.
Proof.--Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,
and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of
friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,
with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.
xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one
to another. Q.E.D.
Note.--The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire
have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,
rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an
emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a
man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c.
He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,
is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the
gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal
his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one
shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be
corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.
PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
good faith.
Proof.--If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a
case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the
danger of present death? Would not his plan of self--preservation
completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by
pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would
persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason
would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their
forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any
general laws, which is absurd.
PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in
a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in
solitude, where he is independent.
Proof.--The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey
through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to
preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is
(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,
he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.
xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.
ii.), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore
the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to
possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.
Note.--These and similar observations, which we have made on
man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to
courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not
think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of
strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no
man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no
man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These
propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and
religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.;
namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every
man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.
We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.
l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever
first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity
of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful
and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,
horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his
own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.
Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they
really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such
as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar
emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as
we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on
his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining
to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in
the following Part.
APPENDIX.
What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life
has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,
but has been set forth piece--meal, according as I thought each
Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.
I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
under leading heads.
I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the
necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either
through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our
being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived
through itself without other individuals.
II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,
that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are
referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to
consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only
referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things
inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined
not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to
us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter
passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,
on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be
either good or bad.
IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect
the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone
man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed
blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which
arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the
understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's
attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of
his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the
ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all
his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate
conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his
intelligence.
V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational
life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his
enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by
intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's
perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational
life, are alone called evil.
VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are
necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external
causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal
nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to
conform to in almost infinite ways.
VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if
he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with
his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,
whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in
harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate
himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.
VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be
capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the
rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems
safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good
or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the
rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we
think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right
of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.
IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any
given thing than other individuals of the same species;
therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and
the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful
than his fellow--man who is led by reason. Further, as we know
not anything among individual things which is more excellent than
a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his
skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at
last to live under the dominion of their own reason.
X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of
hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are
therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful
than their fellows.
XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and
high--mindedness.
XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate
their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds
as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and
generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.
XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.
For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the
guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and
more prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force of
character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to
restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But
those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at
vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than
strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and
others. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from
misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes
rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably
endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and
choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their
father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as
they may spite their parents.
XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in
everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common
brings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is
better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive
to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and
friendship.
XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are
attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For men
brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is
reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received
customs of their society. For winning love those qualities are
especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.
IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).
XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such
harmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of
spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the
same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a
certain resemblance to piety.
XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially
such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain
life. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the
power and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of
any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.
Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited
for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing
for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and
has regard only to the general advantage.
XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our
duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).
XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of
generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort
of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,
readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a
species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than
harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).
XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in
harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not
engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to
beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the
love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused
by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.
XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by
means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None are
more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be
first, but are not.
XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety
and religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet
is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.
note).
XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such
matters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of
pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.
XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are
directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;
and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance
to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass
judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's
rights.
XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire
of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to
piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.). But, if it spring
from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under
the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and
seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word
or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,
I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:
not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called
after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his
conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and
will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but
he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way
whereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by
fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to
endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to
reason.
XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature
in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with
ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,
whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our
advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or
destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to
our use as best we may.
XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to
us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from
observing them, and from recombining their elements in different
forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this
point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and
nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their
functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of being
affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external
bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind
capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.). But there seem to be
very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due
nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.
For the human body is composed of very many parts of different
nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so
that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything
that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the
mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.
XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of
each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one
another mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for
everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind
of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly
conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the
idea of money as cause.
XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek
money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but
because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring
themselves to great splendour. Certainly they nourish their
bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they
lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of
their body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fix
the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,
live content with little.
XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the
various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their
functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid
to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;
it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.
But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us
pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit
our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred
to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore
most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at
hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become
excessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most
regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate
what is future with emotions equally vivid. (IV. xliv. note, and
lx. note.)
XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as
good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.
However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious
take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the
pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection
whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the
divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated
by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is
led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by
reason.
XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is
infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have
not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those
things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an
equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims
of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have
done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not
sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;
remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we
follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding
of this, that part of our nature which is defined by
intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will
assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence
will endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent
beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,
nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which
is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding
of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is
in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.
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