as determined to a particular activity; but from such a
definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can
be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to
imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,
in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c.
For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every
disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be
innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of
thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,
lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.
By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours,
impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each
man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to
another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and
knows not where to turn.
II. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
perfection.
III. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
perfection.
Explanation--I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection
itself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which he
passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of
pleasure. This appears more clearly from the consideration of
the contrary emotion, pain. No one can deny, that pain consists
in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less
perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he
partakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, that
pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For
absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;
wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition
from a greater to a less perfection--in other words, it is an
activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or
constrained (cf. III. xi. note). I pass over the definitions of
merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these
terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely
kinds of pleasure or pain.
IV. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in
question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and
note).
Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,
why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway
falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the
images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one
follows the other. This state of association is impossible, if
the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand
in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other
causes to think of something else.
Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is
of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include
wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include
it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no
positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but
merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the
mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the
contemplation of another.
I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary
emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,
pain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is
customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three
primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the
objects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a
definition of contempt.
V. Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those
qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.
III. lii. note).
The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.
VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.
Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly the
essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say
that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say
that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish
consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I
have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I
mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is
absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for
love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by
wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of
the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the
lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.
VII. Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.
Explanation--These observations are easily grasped after what
has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.
also III. xiii. note).
VIII. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
IX. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which
is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).
X. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.
Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.
lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens
that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall
cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion
readily degenerates into simple love.
XI. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we
hate.
Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we
deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent
rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates that
which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not
without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).
XII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of
something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
the issue.
XIII. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).
Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that there is
no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.
For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of
anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the
existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this
extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while
dependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who
fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something
which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the
existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels
pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will
turn out as he desires (III. xx.).
XIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something
past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
XV. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or
future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair
from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event
has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives
something past or future as present and regards it as such, or
else because he conceives other things, which exclude the
existence of the causes of his doubt. For, although we can never
be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.
xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt
concerning it. For we have shown, that to feel no doubt
concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it
(II. xlix. note). Thus it may happen that we are affected by the
same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or
future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I
have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I
refer the reader.
XVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,
which has had an issue beyond our hope.
XVII. Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of
something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.
XVIII. Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has
befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).
Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there
seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is
used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in
reference to a disposition.
XIX. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
XX. Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to
another.
Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed in
senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But my
purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature
of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my
meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary
signification. One statement of my method will suffice. As for
the cause of the above--named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,
and III. xxii. note.
XXI. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the
love we bear him.
XXII. Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we
hate him.
Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and
disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also
be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too
highly of a beloved object. Contrariwise, disparagement may be
defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too
meanly of a hated object. Cf. III. xxvi. note.
XXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be
pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's
evil fortune.
Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by
doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be
thus defined:
XXIV. Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a
man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at
another's evil fortune.
Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and
xxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain
accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in
itself or accidentally. I now pass on to other emotions, which
are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.
XXV. Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's
contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
XXVI. Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his
own weakness of body or mind.
Explanation--Self--complacency is opposed to humility, in so
far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of
our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby
pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe
we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed
to repentance, which we may thus define:
XXVII. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some
action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision
of our mind.
Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have set forth in
III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note. Concerning
the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note. This is
perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are
called right, are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather
from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on
education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,
and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and
also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought
it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the
latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For
custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that
which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some
consider honourable others consider disgraceful. According as
each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given
action or glories therein.
XXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from
self--love.
Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality, for the
latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride
is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as
partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or
property of self--love, which may therefore be thus defined, love
of self or self--approval, in so far as it leads a man to think
too highly of himself. To this emotion there is no contrary.
For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred;
I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he
conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For
whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he
imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,
that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot
do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it
impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such
matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable
that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen,
that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should
imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the
world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again,
a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in
the present something in relation to a future time of which he is
uncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable
to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do
nothing but what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a
man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive
fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,
venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an
emotion which I will call self--abasement, for as from
self--complacency springs pride, so from humility springs
self--abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:
XXIX. Self--abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by
reason of pain.
Explanation--We are nevertheless generally accustomed to
oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention
to the effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wont
to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who
talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults,
who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a
style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On
the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who
confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and
who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.
However, these emotions, humility and self--abasement, are
extremely rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives
against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence
those, who are believed to be most self--abased and humble, are
generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.
XXX. Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action
of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
[11] Gloria.
XXXI. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of
our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. xxx. But we
should here remark the difference which exists between shame and
modesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are
ashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains
a man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed
to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will
duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have
remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to
their nature.
I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions
arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of
those which I refer to desire.
XXXII. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,
kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same
time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude
the existence of it.
Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are by that very
fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to
contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something
present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,
is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the
existence of that which we remember. Thus when we remember
something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that
very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of
pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once
checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence
of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictly
speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from
the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note). But, as
the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion
down, among the emotions springing from desire.
XXXIII. Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us
by our conception that others have the same desire.
Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees others running
away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again,
he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws
towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own
were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another's
emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of
emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become
customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that
which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the
cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why
this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.
xxxii. and note.
XXXIV. Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing
from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar
feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. III. xxxix.
note and xl.
XXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.
Cf. III. xxvii. note.
XXXVI. Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are
induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.
XXXVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through
mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has
injured us. (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)
XXXVIII. Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is
impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a
passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his
anger and revenge.
XXXIX. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we
dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix. note.
XL. Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do
something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
XLI. Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by
the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the
fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I
do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.
Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so
far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion
of daring.
XLII. Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of
avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species of
cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double
fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a
man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the
evil. I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of
removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement. I say
wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be
constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments
him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may
avert of the two. On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and
III. lii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
note.
XLIII. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the
desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining
from that which should displease them.
XLIV. Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.
Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions
(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened;
therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome. For, so
long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time
necessarily bound by this. "The best men," says Cicero, "are
especially led by honour. Even philosophers, when they write a
book contemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.
XLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living
sumptuously.
XLVI. Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
XLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
XLVIII. Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual
intercourse.
Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is
still called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown in
III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is a species of
ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note.
Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,
and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the
mind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an
ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,
drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear
are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For
an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and
drink at another man's expense. An ambitious man will restrain
himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are
secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,
from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those
vices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. For
though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,
cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain
avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he
cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,
cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so much
concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the
appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to
these emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I will
speak presently.
The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I
pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the
compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because
many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is
sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general
knowledge of them. However, it is established from the
definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they
all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there
is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be
called by a variety of names in accordance with its various
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