other. When this condition of causality is either wholly or
partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part
vanishes. Q.E.D.
PROP. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to
be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if
it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.
Proof.--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)
be perceived through itself without anything else. If,
therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we
shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall
do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the
given emotion. But if the thing which causes the emotion be
conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.
vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of
the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred
towards it will be less. Q.E.D.
Note.--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be
free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards
anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation
of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.
PROP. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
or fear.
Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.
Note.--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or
fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens
are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of
hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of
pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them
with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means
towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles,
or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further, from III.
xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily
in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we
fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or
below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions,
whereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not think it
worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from
hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions,
that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope,
as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further, in so far
as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred;
thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we
have said concerning love and hatred.
PROP. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same
object, and the same man may be differently affected at different
times by the same object.
Proof.--The human body is affected by external bodies in a
variety of ways (II. Post. iii.). Two men may therefore be
differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.
after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by
one and the same object. Further (by the same Post.) the human
body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;
consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected
at different times by one and the same object. Q.E.D.
Note.--We thus see that it is possible, that what one man
loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may
not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he
once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.
Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,
what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it
follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their
emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we
distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and
style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.
For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil
which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into
consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to
benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of
an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him
daring. Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an
evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take
into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of
an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that
he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.
[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human
judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his
emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause
pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,
are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of
things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that
a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another
with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we
can easily understand what are Repentance and Self--complacency.
Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as
cause; Self--complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because
men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).
PROP. LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction
with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property
that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so
long, as an object which we conceive to have some property
peculiar to itself.
Proof.--As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in
conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.
xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the
contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another
object. And this is the case with the object, which we conceive
to have no property that is not common to many. For we thereupon
assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not
before seen in conjunction with other objects. But when we
suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we
have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while
regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to
regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the
contemplation of that object only. Therefore an object, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.--This mental modification, or imagination of a
particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called
Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed
in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to
think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If,
however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or
anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby
regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;
otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at,
the emotion is called Horror. Again, if it be the prudence,
industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our
love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when
joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion. We may in
like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other
emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able
to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in
ordinary speech. Whence it is evident, that the names of the
emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their
ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their
nature.
To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from
the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or
fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears
to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c.,
we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),
determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from
the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,
we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause
of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the
thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities
which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on
the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more
particularly to regard that which is therein. As devotion
springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision
spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn
from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.
Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,
in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other
emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any
recognized name.
PROP. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of
activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in
proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and
its own power of activity.
Proof.--A man does not know himself except through the
modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and
xxiii.). When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate
itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or
(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be
greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able
to conceive itself and its own power of activity. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--This pleasure is fostered more and more, in
proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.
For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more
he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by
the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)
himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea
of himself. Q.E.D.
PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
assert its power of activity.
Proof.--The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual
essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind
obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not
that which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind
endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its
power of activity. Q.E.D.
PROP. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
pain thereat.
Proof.--The essence of the mind only affirms that which the
mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to
conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last
Prop.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own
weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting
to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is
checked in its endeavour----in other words (III. xi. note), it
feels pain. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--This pain is more and more fostered, if a man
conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the
same way as the corollary to III. liii.
Note.--This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,
is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the
contemplation of ourselves, is called self--love or
self--complacency. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as
often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of
activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own
exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and
also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.
Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.
note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of
their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a
man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.
liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and
he conceives them more distinctly--that is (II. xl. note), in
proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard
them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most
pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some
quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms
of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in
general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the
contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall
short when compared with those of others. This pain (III.
xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he
can, embellishing his own.
It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred
and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For
parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely
by the spur of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple
to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's
virtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such
doubts, I append the following corollary.
Corollary.--No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his
equal.
Proof.--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.
xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby
a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is
checked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,
which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a
man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the
same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to
another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot
be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue
in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an
one. But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same
nature as himself. Q.E.D.
Note.--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,
we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,
&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar
to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more
envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions
for being courageous.
PROP. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of
desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as
vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,
hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we
are affected.
Proof.--Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions
compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or
passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive
(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so
far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is,
we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we
conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by
an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the
nature of an external body. Wherefore the nature of every
passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature
of the object whereby we are affected be expressed. Namely, the
pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the
nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the
object B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore these
two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the
causes whence they arise are by nature different. So again the
emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature
different from the pain arising from another object, and,
similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,
&c.
Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,
love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are
affected. Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far
as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any
given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore,
according as a man is affected through external causes by this or
that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words,
according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so
will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one
desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,
as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.
Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of
pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown)
there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects
whereby we are affected. Q.E.D.
Note.--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last
proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,
drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of
love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a
manner varying according to the object, with which they are
concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,
&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,
venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far
as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects
wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For
temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose
to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive
states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the
last--named emotions. However, I cannot here explain the
remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as
the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary.
It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the
strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have
a general definition of each emotion. It is sufficient, I
repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and
the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the
mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions. Thus,
though there is a great difference between various emotions of
love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards
children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us
to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further
the nature and origin of the emotions.
PROP. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the
emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of
the one individual differs from the essence of the other.
Proof.--This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see
after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we will
prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.
All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,
as their definitions above given show. But desire is each man's
nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one
individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so
far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature
or essence of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive
states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to
persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or
hindered (III. xi. and note). But by the endeavour to persist in
its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in
conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note);
therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or
appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or
diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every
man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man
differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so
far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the
essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one
individual only differs, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals
which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of
mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's
emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human
nature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of
procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire
of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of
insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the
several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content
and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his
being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is
nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and
hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of
another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the
essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I have
treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is
passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to
him in so far as he is active.
PROP. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities
or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
Proof.--When the mind conceives itself and its power of
activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind
necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or
adequate idea (II. xliii.). But the mind does conceive certain
adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.). Therefore it feels pleasure in
so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it
is active (III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has
clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,
endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such
an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);
therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we
understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.
PROP. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or
desire.
Proof.--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or
pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain we
mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked
(III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels
pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is
diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions
can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but
only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.
Note.--All actions following from emotion, which are
attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set
down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into
courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By
courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve
his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.
By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,
solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to
unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore,
which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to
courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to
highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind
in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c.,
are varieties of highmindedness.
I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their
primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,
which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,
to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I
have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external
causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds
we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I
have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting
emotions, not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in the
same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to
repentance, scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from
what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with
another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise
therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However,
for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most
important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be
more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning
love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a
thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,
acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another
way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when
we conceive something which generally delights us with its
flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we
are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is
otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus
otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be
stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be
stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel
repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the
presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become
odious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or
weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward
modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for
instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these
are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the
mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be
supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them,
interpolating such observations as I think should here and there
be added.
DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS
I. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given
modification of itself.
Explanation.--We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of
this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof;
further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is
determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or
not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to
avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it
in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those
endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms
appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said,
that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived
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