mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the
mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases
to exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the
existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;
therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the
existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but
(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes
the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,
and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the
essence of our mind.
PROP. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive
those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the
body.
Proof.--So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which
involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and
consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an
external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,
the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature
of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives
things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,
the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of
activity (III. Post. i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind's
power of thinking is for that period increased or helped. Thus
(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine
such things. Q.E.D.
PROP. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or
hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as
possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the
first--named things.
Proof.--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind
alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or
constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue
to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which
excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as
I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is
diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something
else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived:
therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour
to conceive or remember the latter. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from
conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of
itself and of the body.
Note.--From what has been said we may clearly understand the
nature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure
accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing
else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We
further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,
and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who
hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.
But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.
PROP. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at
the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one
of these two, be also affected by the other.
Proof.--If the human body has once been affected by two bodies
at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it
will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But the
mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than
the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore,
if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been
once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever
it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by
the other.
PROP. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,
pain, or desire.
Proof.--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously
affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor
diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either
increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the
foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is
afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which
(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of
action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which
does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.
xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain. Thus the
former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but
accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In the same way
also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the
cause of desire. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing
with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not
the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate
it.
Proof.--For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that
the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with
the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),
according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or
diminished, &c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the
mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.
Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may
love or hate the same. Q.E.D.
Note.--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or
hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We should
refer to the same category those objects, which affect us
pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other
objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the
next Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first
to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to
signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I
think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known
or manifest qualities.
PROP. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given
object has some point of resemblance with another object which is
wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the
point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said
emotions, we shall still regard the first--named object with love
or hate.
Proof.--The point of resemblance was in the object (by
hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus
(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it
will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and
consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point
of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of
pleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although
the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not
the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the
first--named object with love or hate. Q.E.D.
PROP. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect
us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing
which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of
pleasure, we shall hate the first--named thing, and at the same
time we shall love it.
Proof.--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause
of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with
this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive
that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is
wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we
shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it
(III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.
Q.E.D.
Note.--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two
contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the
emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination
(II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from
the other, except as greater differs from less. But we must bear
in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which
give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the
other accidentally. I have done this, in order that they might
be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny
that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an
object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions. The human
body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts
of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.
after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by
one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same
thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different
ways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we can
easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of
many and conflicting emotions.
PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully
by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing
present.
Proof.--So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,
he will regard that thing as present, even though it be
non--existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as
past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the
image of time past or future (II. xliv. note). Wherefore the
image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether
it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that
is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is
identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or
present. Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,
whether the image be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.
Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either
have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according
as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has
recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,
or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its
existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which
excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)
the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way
as if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally
happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so
long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in
doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the
emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so
constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other
things, until men become assured of the issue.
Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what is
meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and
Disappointment.[5] Hope is nothing else but an inconstant
pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,
whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand,
is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something
concerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be
removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear
becomes Despair. In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from
the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.
Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past
whereof we have doubted the issue. Disappointment is the Pain
opposed to Joy.
[5] Conscientiæ morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
PROP. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is
destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved
he will feel pleasure.
Proof.--The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive
those things which increase or help the body's power of activity
(III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which
it loves. But conception is helped by those things which
postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered
by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);
therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of
an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the
object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind
pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the
existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental
endeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully. He,
therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
will feel pain, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is
destroyed will also feel pleasure.
Proof.--The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those
things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's
power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III.
xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the
existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing,
which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the
aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects
the mind pleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of
his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is
affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected
pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will
be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or
less in the thing loved.
Proof.--The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which
postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's
endeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure postulates
the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in
proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is
(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore
the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental
endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover
pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion
may have been greater in the object of love. This was our first
point. Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it
is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to
the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who
conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,
will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said
emotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects
some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards
that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an
object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred
towards it.
Proof.--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of
our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we
conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or
pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come
to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore
(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object
of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with
love or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.
Note.--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we
may define as pain arising from another's hurt. What term we can
use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.
We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on
another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures
another, we will call Indignation. We must further remark, that
we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown
in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto
regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles
ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval
on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,
contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.
PROP. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he
thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel
pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according
as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.
Proof.--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully
affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the
strength of the pain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.)
who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully
affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the
amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred. This
was our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the existence of
the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as
the pleasure is greater or less. If anyone imagines that an
object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception
(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other
words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.
Q.E.D.
Note.--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and
without any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop.
xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to
himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like
manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary
circumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only.
PROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an
object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we
conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall
feel love towards him.
Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
xxii., which see.
Note.--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so
far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's
hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.
PROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to
affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise,
we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
painfully ourselves or the loved object.
Proof.--That, which we conceive to affect an object of our
love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or
painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it
endeavours to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III.
xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as
affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.
Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
Proof.--This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the
foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.
Note.--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may
easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,
contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is
called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of
himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with
his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that
fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting
them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to
conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines
his own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing
from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure
which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called
over--esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too
little of a man is called disdain.
PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is
like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,
to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a
like emotion (affectus).
Proof.--The images of things are modifications of the human
body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to
us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas
involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature
of the external bodies as present. If, therefore, the nature of
the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the
idea which we form of the external body will involve a
modification of our own body similar to the modification of the
external body. Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to
ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will
express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.
Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be
affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
emotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we
shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not
similar, emotion. Q.E.D.
Note I.--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to
pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is
referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else
but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we
conceive that others have the like desire.
Corollary I.--If we conceive that anyone, whom we have
hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something
similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the
same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
Proof.--This is proved from the last proposition in the same
manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.
Corollary II.--We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
its misery affects us painfully.
Proof.--If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice
in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
Corollary III.--We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,
a thing which we pity.
Proof.--That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,
affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);
therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which
removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in
other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we
shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall
endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.
Note II.--This will or appetite for doing good, which arises
from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is
called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from
compassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has done
good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like
ourselves, see III. xxii. note.
PROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
conduce to pain.
Proof.--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that
which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other
words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as
possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour of
the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power
of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.
Coroll.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the
same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first
point. Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed
to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall,
therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy
the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may
not regard it as present; this was our second point. Wherefore
whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
whom we regard without any particular emotion.
Proof.--From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate
anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).
That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel
pleasure or pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall
endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with
pleasure, etc. Q.E.D.
Note.--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit
certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it
is generally called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name of
praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of
another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame
to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.
PROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as
affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he
will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has
done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
he will regard himself with pain.
Proof.--He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure
or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with
pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and
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