Proof.--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,
in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind
(II. xi. Coroll.). Let us suppose that there is in God, in so
far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,
A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be
referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,
whereof the proof is of universal application). But the idea A
is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed
through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must
be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi.
Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,
which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate
idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time
have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that
is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.
Note.--I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing
proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a
true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression
for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one,
indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
thinking--namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask,
can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a
thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can
there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and
darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
questions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false
idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes
it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These
questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is
plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to
the latter as being is to not--being. The causes of falsity I
have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the
note. From what is there stated, the difference between a man
who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made
apparent. As for the last question--as to how a man can be sure
that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just
pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises
from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with
its object--in other words, that truth is its own standard. We
may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is
part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.);
therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as
necessarily true as the ideas of God.
PROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things
as contingent, but as necessary.
Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly
(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves--that
is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that it is only through our
imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
future or the past, as contingent.
Note.--How this way of looking at things arises, I will
briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)
that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even
though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which
exclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we
showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two
external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards
imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway
remember the other--that is, it will regard both as present to
itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence
and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from
the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than
others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us
suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in
the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that
today he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from
II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he
will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the
sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other
words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his
imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he
will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon--that
is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation
to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the
evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by
imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past
time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other
evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on
the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening
sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the
child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,
not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and,
with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first
one, then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future,
neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This
wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may
imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time
present, past, or future.
Corollary II.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive
things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis
specie).
Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as
contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives this
necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it
is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very
necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the
nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.
We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.
xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.
xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:
which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,
under a certain form of eternity.
PROP. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular
thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and
infinite essence of God.
Proof.--The idea of a particular thing actually existing
necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
said thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be
conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
attributes of those ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
Note.--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,
existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of
existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat, of
the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in
God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by
another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force
whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).
PROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of
God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.
Proof.--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea
thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),
will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore,
that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the
whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
Q.E.D.
PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
eternal and infinite essence of God.
Proof.--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
Note.--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God,
and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,
and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to
speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as
they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine
God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the
name God with images of things that they are in the habit of
seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they
are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many
errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do
not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says
that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its
circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly
attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that
assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in
calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and
another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do
not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that
they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the
paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in
error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I
lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a
neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.
Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do
not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret
the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly
contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of
the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider
mistaken and absurd in their opponents.
PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will;
but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which
has also been determined by another cause, and this last by
another cause, and so on to infinity.
Proof.--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.
xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute
faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by
another cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind
no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.
Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.
Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to
this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to
this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul. The cause
which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in
the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would
here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the
faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby
the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,
wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.
After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general
notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular
instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether
volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.
We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any
affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as
it is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following
proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should
suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are
formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but
the conceptions of thought.
PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
involves.
Proof.--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this
or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us
conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a
triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation
involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same
thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as
it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further,
this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be
conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of a
triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its
three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore,
and vice versâ, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be
conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation
belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing
besides. What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have
selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,
that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Will and understanding are one and the same.
Proof.--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a
particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
one and the same. Q.E.D.
Note.--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity
consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas
which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea,
inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we
say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he
has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is
false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his
imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although the
man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say
that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive
(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and
I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced
against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
advantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some," for they will
be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
part.
I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is
further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
words, whereby we signify things. These three--namely, images,
words, and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused
together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for
philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those
who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas
of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not
ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not
see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with
ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that
they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or
deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who
reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no
wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly
understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not
consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of
words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no
wise involve the conception of thought.
These few words on this subject will suffice: I will
therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised
against our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those,
who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,
and that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for
their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the
understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do
not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from
the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.
For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not
therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not
deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does
exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by
experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and
different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be
objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more
reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to
need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power
than for affirming, that what is false is true. We have,
however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than
another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so
also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this
also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and
the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from
free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are
equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he
perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall
seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather
than an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then
determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections
might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
possible.
To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will
has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding
be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the
same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an
infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be
urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we
explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which is
common to all such volitions.
As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
infinite number of individuals.
To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a
free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that
anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that
he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.
Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a
perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point,
let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing
else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the
horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything
which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will
necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to
doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We
have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I
do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,
while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his
judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it
about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that
he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we
suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as
actual perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's
imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of
a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the
mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons
for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the
subject.
I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third
objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is
predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is
common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate
essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the
abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the
same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting
the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular
affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For
instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,
differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much
as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.
Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal
power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and
to affirm that that which is false is true. These two
affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
one another as being and not--being; for there is nothing
positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when
we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
and abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I
am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from
him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such
an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be
considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider
children, fools, madmen, &c.
It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
from what has been said. The doctrine is good,
1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so
much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and
more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely
tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest
happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of
God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God
with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as
for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct
ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which
are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it
shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or
frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the
eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from
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