been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are
nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant
as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that
everything was created for the sake of themselves; and,
according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,
healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion which
objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,
the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary
motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are
styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,
full--flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,
rough or smooth, &c.
Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,
sound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic
enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in
harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded
themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to
harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone
judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather
mistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need no
longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we
have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human
bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they
differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;
what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what
is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not
further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the
subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well
known. It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;
everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as
palates." All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things
according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I
have urged.
We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly
given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate
the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the
imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were
entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all
arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily
rebutted.
Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a
necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there
so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things
corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,
confusion, evil, sin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I have
said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be
reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not
more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human
senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to
mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men,
that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but
this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of
every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more
strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to
suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an
infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if
there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily
dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.
Part II.
ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
PREFACE
I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and
infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part
i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
and its highest blessedness.
DEFINITIONS
DEFINITION I. By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain
determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is
considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,
Coroll.)
DEFINITION II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing
that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,
and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;
in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is
formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
Explanation.--I say conception rather than perception, because
the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in
respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an
activity of the mind.
DEFINITION IV. By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so
far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the
object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
Explanation.--I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark
which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and
its object (ideatum).
DEFINITION V. Duration is the indefinite continuance of
existing.
Explanation.--I say indefinite, because it cannot be
determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or
by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of
the thing, but does not take it away.
DEFINITION VI. Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.
DEFINITION VII. By particular things, I mean things which are
finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several
individual things concur in one action, so as to be all
simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so
far, as one particular thing.
AXIOMS
I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that
is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or
that man does or does not exist.
II. Man thinks.
III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea
can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
modes of thought.
N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
xiii.
PROPOSITIONS
PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
thing.
Proof.--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses
the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved
in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.
Note.--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we
are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in
proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,
in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the
consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,
thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the
infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
PROP. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an
extended thing.
Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
the last.
PROP. III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his
essence.
Proof.--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all
that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).
Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and
in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)
Note.--The multitude understand by the power of God the free
will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For
it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
reduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often
likened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have refuted
(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown
(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as
that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We
further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
him as non--existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I
could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
negation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same
ground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to
turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from
Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning,
unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of
God with the human power and right of kings.
PROP. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of
things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
Proof.--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.). Therefore the
idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in
infinite ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.
PROP. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only
in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far
as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas
both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own
as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
Proof.--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of
ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of
ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in
so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they
are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other attribute.
Proof.--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
any other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence the actual being of things, which are not
modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because
that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things
represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
the attribute of thought.
PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
order and connection of things.
Proof.--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For
the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of
the cause, whereof it is an effect.
Corollary.--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
realized power of action--that is, whatsoever follows from the
infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
follows without exception in the same order and connection from
the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
Note.--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what
has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be
perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the
idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in
two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle
existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things
as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in
the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they
are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present
explain my meaning more clearly.
PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
are contained in the attributes of God.
Proof.--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
understood more clearly from the preceding note.
Corollary.--Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,
except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when
particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they
are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they
are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,
through which they are said to continue.
Note.--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such
that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the
rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;
thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet
none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far
as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from
this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of
these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the
idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of
those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the
remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
PROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as
he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
Proof.--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus
(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only
as he is a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)
in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so
on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by
Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of
causes. Therefore of a given individual idea another individual
idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that
idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in
so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of
any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he
has the idea of the object.
Proof.--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the
same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge,
therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.
Q.E.D.
PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the
essence of man--in other words, substance does not constitute the
actual being[2] of man.
[2] "Forma"
Proof.--The being of substance involves necessary existence
(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance
appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd
(II. Ax. i.). Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which
it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same
nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is
not that which constitutes the actual being of man. Again, the
proposition is evident from the other properties of
substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to
the essence of man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) is
something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),
or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
manner.
Note.--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and
only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect
to their being (secundum esse).
At the same time many assert, that that, without which a
thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the
cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the
proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which
should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the
order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be
last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are
considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to
the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to
the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in
mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the
knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are
no help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is
hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
themselves freely.
However, I pass over this point. My intention here was only
to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered
as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
conceived." (II. Def. ii.)
PROP. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being
of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
existing.
Proof.--The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)
is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
mind. But not the idea of a non--existent thing, for then (II.
viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of
an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
existing. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human
mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so
far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we
say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500